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As the scientific community speaks in unison regarding mankind’s role in climate 
change, the rhetoric over the potential security implications of a changing climate is 
much less coherent. This thesis investigates whether a country’s dependence on foreign 
food imports and food aid alters the relationship between deviations in normal rainfall 
patterns and conflict in Africa. The results of this study indicate that (i) deviations in both 
previous year and contemporaneous rainfall significantly impact cereal supplies with 
previous year rainfall exhibiting a stronger correlative effect; (ii) countries that depend 
more heavily on cereal foods sourced from outside their borders display a lower risk of 
civil conflict during wetter than normal years and non-government-targeted social 
conflict during anomalously wet and dry years when compared to countries that produce 
the majority of their cereal supplies domestically; and (iii) the risk of violent, nonviolent, 
and government-targeted social conflict is greater following significant fluctuations in 
rainfall for the those countries that grow the majority of their own cereal. These findings 
suggest that mitigation strategies focused on improving water management, developing 
more efficient and stable import practices, and diversifying a country’s food sourcing 
options may reduce the impact of climate change–induced conflict. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does a country’s (in)dependence on foreign food sources (imports and aid) 
influence the incidence of civil conflict following weather-related shocks to its water 
supply? Are countries that import or receive the majority of their food in aid somehow 
insulated from the negative effects of precipitation-related fluctuations in domestic 
agricultural production, and thus at a lower risk for social conflict, civil war, and 
insurgency? This thesis will examine the relationship between precipitation, food supply, 
dependence foreign food sources, and the onset of civil and social conflict in Africa 
immediately following significant deviations from normal rainfall patterns in both the 
positive and negative direction. As a baseline, this thesis will reevaluate a study 
conducted by Hendrix and Salehyan that examines the causal effect of precipitation 
shocks on various measures of conflict and attempts to strengthen their models by 
applying several additional control variables to test whether a country’s level of 
dependence on foreign food imports and aid alters the potential adverse effects of climate 
change.1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the scientific community continues to coalesce around a growing body of 
evidence indicating a direct anthropogenic link to climate change, international rhetoric, 
amongst policy makers in particular, regarding the potential security implications of a 
changing climate is, much like the atmosphere, gradually heating up. Oft-cited claims 
suggest that climate change (changes in average temperature, precipitation patterns, 
length of growing season, etc.) will have a catastrophic impact on global food supplies, 
economic production, and access to adequate drinking water. It is further argued that 
these climatically induced conditions, in conjunction with forced migrations associated 
                                                 
1 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan. “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa.” 
Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 35–50, https://doi.org/10.117 7/0022343311426165. 
 2 
with rising sea levels and resource scarcity, will lead to increased levels of instability and 
violent conflict. Once regarded as alarmist prophecies along the same lines as Paul 
Ehrlich’s best-selling yet highly criticized book The Population Bomb, these dire 
warnings have since percolated to the highest levels of government.2 The United States 
Department of Defense (DOD), in particular, recognizes climate change as a significant 
threat to all three of what it believes are the most basic tenets of national and international 
security: defense, diplomacy, and economics.3 In 2011, the DOD issued a comprehensive 
report outlining the potential global implications of climate change with a special focus 
on Africa and in 2014, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel warned that  
Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea 
levels, and more extreme weather events will intensify the challenges of 
global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict. They will likely lead to 
food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and 
resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe.4 
Subsequently, the most recent National Security Strategy (2015) issued by the White 
House identified climate change as an “urgent and growing threat” to national security.5 
Simultaneously, apocalyptic scenarios involving potential “climate wars” have led 
to several bold predictions within the academic community. Most notable, perhaps, is a 
2009 estimate by Marshal Burke et al. projecting an additional 393,000 battle deaths by 
2030 due to global warming.6 Compounding these ominous predictions even further is a 
recent New York magazine article that suggests these climate wars will erupt “sooner than 
                                                 
2 Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1968).  
3 U.S. Department of Defense, Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and 
International Security (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, October 2011), xii. 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations, and Environment) Environment, Safety & 
Occupational Health Directorate, June 2014): Foreword; DOD, Trends and Implications of Climate Change 
for National and International Security. 
5 Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February, 2015): 
12. 
6 Marshall B. Burke et al., “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20670, 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0907998106. 
 3 
you think.”7 Humans, however, do not freely resort to violence, as Halvard Buhaug notes, 
simply because “temperature heats up or rainfall comes in unexpected ways.”8 The 
effects of climate change on global unrest are much more likely to be indirect and, 
therefore, must be examined with a more disaggregated approach to flush out 
intermediate causal links connecting climate change to the outbreak of conflict.9  
Much of the current research examining the potential links between climate 
change and conflict focuses on whether deviations from annual mean temperature and 
precipitation rates impact the availability of critical resources. Food security related 
issues, in particular, have garnered considerable attention as potential precursors to 
conflict due to the direct dependence of agricultural production on weather conditions. 
Unfortunately, if such a causal connection exists, the time horizon for reversing current 
climate trends will, at best, be measured in terms of decades or, worse yet, centuries. As 
such, the ability to diagnose the intermediate linkages between the manifestation of 
climate change and the onset of conflict will assist in identifying those populations most 
vulnerable to climate change-induced conflict. Early detection, in turn, will allow for the 
timely implementation of cost effective, and politically tenable intervention plans 
designed to increase resilience among the most vulnerable populations. 
Due to its relatively high rates of conflict and a wide range of social, political, and 
economic conditions conducive to civil war and lower levels of social contention, 
Africa’s perceived vulnerability to climate change is often the focal point for an extensive 
cross section of the ongoing climate change-conflict research.10 One of the primary risk 
factors besieging the continent is the fact that large segments of the African population, 
                                                 
7 David Wallace Wells, “The Uninhabitable Earth,” New York Magazine, July 9, 2017, 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html. For examples 
of “climate wars” see Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Canada: Random House, 2008); Harald Welzer, 
Climate Wars: What People Will Be Killed for in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 
8 Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Change and Conflict: Taking Stock,” Peace Economics, Peace Science, 
& Public Policy 22, no. 4 (December 2016): 333.  
9 Emily Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding the Small Talk about the Weather,” 
International Studies Review 15, no. 2 (June 2013): 194, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misr.12030. 
10 Ole Magnus Theisen, Helge Holtermann, and Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Wars? Assessing the 
Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 102–104, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428110. 
 4 
as much 60 percent of the workforce, remain dependent upon agricultural production, 
rain-fed agriculture in particular, for their livelihoods.11 Unfortunately, an extensive body 
of research compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) predicts that current trends in climate 
change will severely alter precipitation patterns throughout the African continent.12 
Reductions in rainfall are projected for both northern and southern Africa, wetter 
conditions are expected over much of west Africa, while eastern Africa, on a whole, is 
forecast to experience increases in rainfall with several sub-regional areas projected to 
undergo drier conditions. Extreme rainfall deviations, including more frequent episodes 
of drought and inundation, are also projected to increase with regional variation. As it 
stands, the African continent will be one of the areas most directly impacted by climate 
change and, therefore, most at risk for climate change induced conflict, should a 
connection exist.  
The following chapters of this thesis will begin with a review of the current 
literature addressing potential links between climate change and the onset of conflict with 
a particular focus on precipitation and food security. Chapter III will develop a theory of 
how a dependence on food from foreign sources may mitigate the effects of significant 
deviations from normal rainfall patterns at the country level on the onset of conflict, 
which the discussed body of literature will propose. Chapter IV will outline the data and 
methodology utilized in the analysis followed by a presentation of the results. The final 
chapter will offer a brief discussion on the potential implications of these findings.   
                                                 
11 Nienke M. Beintema and Gert-Jan Stads, “Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Research— Recent 
Investment Trends,” Outlook on Agriculture 33, no. 4 (2004): 239–246, 
https://doi.org/10.5367/0000000042664774; Isabelle Niang et al., “Africa,” in Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Vincente R. Barros et al. 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 1209–12011. 
12 Niang et al., “Africa”, 1218. 
 5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY  
There is an almost universal agreement among scientists that anthropomorphic 
contributions to greenhouse gases are accelerating the rate of global climate change.13 
There is, however, less of a consensus regarding what the overall implications of a 
changing climate are when viewed from a national security standpoint. Ullman provides 
one of the earliest works to argue that, in broad terms, environmental degradation could 
have a negative impact on national security and that sudden shocks to resource supplies 
are particularly disruptive.14 Several years later, the 42nd United Nations General 
Assembly (1987) introduced a number of resolutions tied to the concept of environmental 
security with warnings of unprecedented “suffering, economic losses and social 
disruption.”15  
Pioneered in large part by the Thomas Homer-Dixon led Project on Environment, 
Population, and Security, this emerging field of environmental security narrowed over the 
following decade around the belief that environmental changes could spark violent 
conflict. In particular, Homer-Dixon and colleagues argued that environmental stresses 
leading to resource scarcity increase the risk of internal conflict when quality of life is 
                                                 
13 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 
2014): v.  
14 Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 134–146, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538489; Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. Glaser, “Trends and Triggers: 
Climate, Climate Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August 
2007): 696, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006. 
For additional early research regarding resource scarcity see Ruth W. Arad and Uzi B. Arad, “Scarce 
Natural Resources and Potential Conflict,” in Sharing Global Resources ed. Ruth W. Arad (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979): 23–104; Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 
(Spring 1989): 162–177, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1989-03-01/redefining-security. 
15 United Nations General Assembly, Resolutions A/RES/42/189A-D, Implementation of the Plan of 
Action to Combat Desertification, (December 11, 1987), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/42/189. 
 6 
impacted.16 At the time, the proposed origins of these environmental stresses were more 
neo-Malthusian than climate-related and categorized into three overarching subsets: 
supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural (maldistribution).17  
Critiques of Homer-Dixon’s models argued that the causal chains presented were 
too complex and, therefore, precluded clear identification of environmental degradation 
as a determinant source of conflict.18 In addition, although referenced in general terms, 
there was an overall lack of systematic analysis applied to control for a mix of political, 
economic, and cultural variables. Additionally, distinctions between environmentally 
induced scarcity and societal mismanagement of resources were absent, blurring the 
climate change-conflict connection. 
B. THE CLIMATE CHANGE-CONFLICT DEBATE 
Over the past 10–15 years, climate change has replaced population growth and 
more general environmental degradation (toxic waste, water pollution, deforestation, etc.) 
as the primary focus within much of the environmental security literature.19 In addition to 
Burke et al.’s doomsday estimate of over a third of a million climate change-related battle 
deaths, there are a number of empirical studies that suggest a direct causal link between 
                                                 
16 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” 
International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 76–116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539061; Thomas Homer-
Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, 
no. 1 (Summer 1994): 5–40, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539147; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, 
Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
17 Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The 
Case of South Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 282–285, 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343398035003002; Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, Ecoviolence: 
Links among Environment, Population, and Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 5–7. 
18 Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal 
of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 381–400, http://www.jstor.org/stable/424942. 
19 Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 185–203. 
 7 
climate change and increasing levels of conflict.20 Although more systematic in their 
analysis than previous works, including efforts to apply meaningful controls, the bulk of 
these large-N analyses are challenged by an opposing collection of quantitative studies 
that find no significant link between climate change and conflict.21 Koubi et al. and van 
Weezel find that reductions in economic growth as a result of climate variability do not 
appear to have a significant impact on conflict, while Schleussner et al. suggest that, 
although climate related disasters are not robustly associated as direct triggers for conflict 
on a global scale, these disruptive conditions have a greater propensity to dissolve into 
violence when they occur in ethnically fractionalized societies.22 Muddying the waters 
further are suggestions that global warming could actually coincide with a reduction in 
conflict, as the economic development typically associated with contributing to increased 
greenhouse gas emissions also serves to encourage interstate peace.23 This lack of 
consensus is, perhaps, most evident in the ongoing debate between two research camps 
led primarily by Burke, Solomon Hsiang, and Edward Miguel (robust causal links) and 
                                                 
20 In addition to Burke et al., “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War” see Hanne Fjelde and Nina 
von Uexkull, “Climate Triggers: Rainfall Anomalies, Vulnerability and Communal Conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” Political Geography 31, no. 7 (September 2012): 444–453, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.08.004. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.08.004; Hendrix 
and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 35–50; Clionadh Raleigh and 
Dominic Kniveton, “Come Rain Or Shine: An Analysis of Conflict and Climate Variability in East Africa,” 
Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 51–64, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427754. 
21 Mathieu Couttenier and Raphael Soubeyran, “Drought and Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa,” The 
Economic Journal 124, no. 575 (March 2014): 201, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12042; Rune T. 
Slettebak, “Don’t Blame the Weather! Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict,” Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 163, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311425693; Ole Magnus Theisen, 
“Climate Clashes? Weather Variability, Land Pressure, and Organized Violence in Kenya, 1989–2004,” 
Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 81–96, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311425842. 
22 Vally Koubi et al., “Climate Variability, Economic Growth, and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace 
Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 124, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427173; Stijn van Weezel, “Economic 
Shocks & Civil Conflict Onset in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981–2010,” Defense and Peace Economics 26, no. 
2 (2015): 153, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.887489; Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al., 
“Armed-Conflict Risks Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters in Ethnically Fractionalized Countries,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113, no. 33 (August 16, 
2016): 9216, http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1601611113. 
23 Erik Gartzke, “Could Climate Change Precipitate Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 
(2012): 177–192, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427342. 
 8 
Buhaug (weak or absent causal links), who report opposing conclusions when examining 
similar data sets and empirical studies.24  
Congruent with the aforementioned divergent opinions emanating from the 
broader climate change-conflict literature as a whole, the observed effects of rainfall as 
an individual influencer on conflict also lack a consensus. Fjelde and Uexkall find that, 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, communal conflict is more likely during anomalously dry years. 
Analyses by Theisen and Hendrix and Salehyan, on the other hand, show that civil 
conflict (i.e., armed conflict in which one side is represented by the government to 
include civil war and insurgency) occurs more frequently during wetter than normal years 
and hypothesize that extreme resource scarcity associated with severe droughts limit the 
mobilization efforts required to sustain large-scale violence.25 Similar arguments that 
wetter conditions beget violence can be found in Adano et al., Butler and Gates, and 
Witsenburg and Adano; the latter of whom find that, contrary to resource scarcity theory, 
pastoralists are more likely to engage in violent livestock raiding during periods of 
relative abundance while cooperating when water is limited.26 Conversely, Ember et al. 
contend that the relationship between precipitation and pastoral violence is negatively 
correlated. Hendrix and Salehyan find increased levels of social conflict in years 
exhibiting extreme rainfall deviations in both directions—drought and inundation.27 
                                                 
24 Burke et al., “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War”; Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Not to Blame 
for African Civil Wars,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
107, no. 38 (September 21, 2010): 16477-16482, http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1005739107; Solomon M. 
Hsiang and Kyle C. Meng, “Reconciling Disagreement Over Climate-Conflict Results in Africa,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111, no. 6 (2014): 2100, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1316006111; Halvard Buhaug et al., “One Effect to Rule Them All? A 
Comment on Climate and Conflict,” Climatic Change 127, no. 3–4 (December 2014): 391–397. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1266-1; Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel, 
“Climate and Conflict,” Annual Review of Economics 7, (2015): 577–617, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
economics-080614-115430. 
25 Fjelde and Uexkall, “Climate Triggers,” 452; Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, 
and Social Conflict in Africa,” 46. 
26 Wario R. Adano et al., “Climate Change, Violent Conflict and Local Institutions in Kenya’s 
Drylands,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 77, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427344; 
Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates, “African Range Wars: Climate, Conflict, and Property Rights,” 
Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 30–32, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311426166; Karen 
M. Witsenburg and Wario R. Adano, “Of Rain and Raids: Violent Livestock Raiding in Northern Kenya,” 
Civil Wars 11, no. 4 (December 2009): 536, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240903403915. 
27 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 44. 
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Raleigh and Kniveton link higher rates of rebel conflict during both drier conditions and 
increased communal conflict during anomalously wet conditions.28 Suggestions regarding 
the potential source for the conflicting nature of these findings include disagreements 
over climate versus weather, varying definitions of conflict, geographic scales, temporal 
lags, and meta-analysis approaches as the likely root causes for the ongoing disparity 
within the climate change-conflict research.29 
C. FOOD SECURITY AND CONFLICT 
One strategy to overcome the inconsistencies within the analytic framework of the 
aforementioned body of research is to apply a multi-stage approach to identify the 
intermediate social, political, and economic linkages that allow for meteorological 
indicators such as temperature and precipitation to influence the onset or severity of 
conflict.30 In a return to Homer-Dixon’s theory of resource scarcity, research concerning 
food insecurity as a potential driver of conflict is beginning to accumulate. Reductions in 
crop yields as a result of changing precipitation patterns can influence food access both 
directly, in terms of food available for consumption, and indirectly due to the web of 
factors that influence food prices and purchasing power in response to lost wages.31 
Several studies indicate that countries exhibiting poor health and nutrition display higher 
                                                 
28 Carol R. Ember et al., “Livestock Raiding and Rainfall Variability in Northwestern Kenya,” Civil 
Wars 14, no. 2 (June 2012): 159, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.679497; Raleigh and Kniveton, 
“Come Rain Or Shine,” 51. 
29 Thomas Bernauer, Tobias Böhmelt, and Vally Koubi, “Environmental Changes and Violent 
Conflict,” Environmental Research Letters 7, no. 1 (2012): 1-6, http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-
9326/7/1/015601; Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Whither the Weather? Climate Change and Conflict,” Journal of 
Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 3–9, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431288; Meierding, “Climate 
Change and Conflict,” 189–191; Idean Salehyan, “Climate Change and Conflict: Making Sense of 
Disparate Findings,” Political Geography 43 (November 2014): 1–5, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.10.004; Juergen Scheffran et al., “Climate Change and Violent 
Conflict,” Science 336, (May 18, 2012): 869–871, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1221339. 
30 Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 189; Buhaug, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 334. 
31 Michael Oppenheimer et al., “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities” in Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Vincente R. Barros et al. 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 1059–1060. 
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frequencies of civil conflict.32 In addition, low levels of caloric intake per capita are also 
linked to an increased likelihood of democratic breakdowns within emerging 
democracies, which, in turn, has the potential to affect civil conflict given that non-
democratic states display higher rates of civil war deaths.33 Exacerbating these potential 
links is a study by Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton that suggests food security and violence 
are intertwined in a positive feedback loop wherein rising food prices lead to increased 
violent conflict; the effects of which, in turn, cause food prices to rise even further.34 
Although the exact pathway from precipitation to food security/insecurity to conflict is 
complex, explanations addressing the broader mechanisms driving this relationship 
typically fall into on one of two contrasting narratives—scarcity versus abundance—
depending on the observed sign of the rainfall deviation.  
When examining a food dependent causal pathway, Homer-Dixon’s resource 
scarcity theory is, perhaps, the most frequently applied model within the current climate 
change-conflict research for articulating how drier than normal conditions lead to 
elevated levels of lower forms of political and social conflict, such as protests, riots, 
strikes, and communal violence.35 This ‘zero-sum’ narrative suggests that drought 
conditions reduce agricultural production leading to intense competition over 
increasingly scarce or more expensive food supplies whereby individuals or groups may 
                                                 
32 Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Satoru Shimokawa, “Do Poverty and Poor Health and Nutrition Increase 
the Risk of Armed Conflict Onset?,” Food Policy 33, no. 6 (December 2008): 513–520, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2008.05.003; Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, “Food 
Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges,” World Food 
Programme Occasional Paper 24, (2011): 5-10, http:// 
documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ newsroom/wfp238358.pdf.  
33 Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 2 
(2006): 276, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002705284828; Christopher Reenock, Michael Bernhard, and 
David Sobek, “Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution and Democratic Survival,” International Studies 
Quarterly 51, no. 3 (September 2007): 693–694, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4621733. 
34 Clionadh Raleigh, Hyun Jin Choi, and Dominc Kniveton, “The Devil is in the Details: An 
Investigation of the Relationships Between Conflict, Food Price and Climate Across Africa,” Global 
Environmental Change 32 (2015): 187, http://dx.doi/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.005. 
35 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 45–56; Raleigh 
and Kniveton, “Come Rain Or Shine,” 54. 
 11 
eventually become desperate and, subsequently, resort to the use of force.36 Although less 
intuitive, this pathway is sometimes also proposed for extremely wet conditions due to a 
combination of reduced crop yields as a result of flooding and limited distribution 
capacities as unpaved roads linking more rural agricultural regions with net-purchasing 
urban populations become impassible.37  
Wischnath and Buhaug propose three complementary processes connecting 
reduced agricultural production to conflict: lowered opportunity costs, increased 
recruitment pools, and more widespread social grievances.38 The crux of this theory 
suggests that when adequate food supplies are available, the opportunity costs of taking 
up arms against the government remain relatively high.39 When reductions in agricultural 
and pastoral production lead to higher food prices and lost incomes, these opportunity 
costs may begin to drop. Once an individual’s basic needs are no longer met through 
legal means his or her participation in contentious behavior becomes more economically 
advantageous.40 At the same time, reductions in agricultural-based tax revenues leave 
governments less able to meet the growing entitlement needs of a hungry population.41 
Additionally, shocks to the agriculture sector often lead to high levels of unemployment 
for young, uneducated men in rural areas who, unfortunately, comprise the same 
                                                 
36 John W. Maxwell and Rafael Reuveny, “Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Developing Countries,” 
Journal of Peace and Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 303–304, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343300037003002; 
Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton, “The Devil is in the Details,” 188; Raleigh and Kniveton, “Come Rain Or 
Shine,” 54. 
37 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 37. 
38 Gerdis Wischnath and Halvard Buhaug, “Rice or Riots: On Food Production and Conflict Severity 
Across India,” Political Geography 43 (November 2014): 6–15, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.07.004. 
39 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
no. 4 (October 2004): 563–595, https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064. 
40 Hanne Fjelde, “Farming or Fighting? Agricultural Price Shocks and Civil War in Africa,” World 
Development 67 (2015): 525–34, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.032; Edward Miguel, Shanker 
Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: an Instrumental Variables 
Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 4 (2004): 725–53, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/421174. 
41 Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), 38. 
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demographic as those most likely to become potential combatants.42 Furthermore, 
mismanagement of relief aid due to a combination of weak governance and diminishing 
capacity, whether real or perceived, exacerbate the level of grievances against the state, 
an important factor in social mobilization theory.43 Evidence for the scarcity relationship 
is found in studies linking increased conflict in the wake of reduced rice yields in both 
India and Indonesia.44 For lower levels of political and social conflict, such as protests, 
riots, strikes, and communal violence, the relationship is more curvilinear with 
precipitation shocks on both ends of the spectrum (high and low rainfall) increasing the 
likelihood of conflict.45 Additional research utilizing food prices as a proxy for food 
scarcity link rising food prices and increases in conflict with several studies suggesting 
that the 2011 Arab Spring was sparked, at least in part, by international spikes in food 
prices.46 The validity of those claims, however, remains in question.47  
Abundance theory, on the other hand, relies on a similar cost-benefit calculation 
but operates in the opposite direction. Positive shocks to the water supply (above average 
rainfall) can enhance agricultural productivity which, in turn, may increase rent-seeking 
behavior, provide the necessary resources to recruit and fund insurgencies, and lead to 
                                                 
42 Brinkman and Hendrix (2011), 6; Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and 
Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (September 2006): 607–629, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00416.x. 
43 David Sobek and Charles Boehmer, “If They Only Had Cake: The Effect of Food Supply on Civil 
War Onset,” 1960–1999,” Unpublished manuscript: 12; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14. 
44 Raul Caruso, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti, “Climate Change, Rice Crops, and Violence: 
Evidence from Indonesia,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 1 (2016): 66, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315616061; Wischnath and Buhaug, “Rice or Riots,” 6. 
45 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 45–56; Raleigh 
and Kniveton, “Come Rain Or Shine,” 62. 
46 Annia Ciezadlo, “Let Them Eat Bread,” Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2001, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2011-03-23/let-them-eat-bread; Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey 
Mazo, “Global Warming and the Arab Spring,” Survival: Global Politics Strategy 53 (2011): 11–17, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.571006; Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton, “The Devil is in the 
Details,” 187; Todd Graham Smith, “Feeding Unrest: Disentangling the Causal Relationship Between Food 
Price Shocks and Sociopolitical Conflict in Urban Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 6 (2014), 
679–695, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314543722; Troy Sternberg, “Chinese Drought, Bread and the 
Arab Spring,” Applied Geography 34 (May 2012): 519–524, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2012.02.004. 
47 Smith, “Feeding Unrest,” 681–682. 
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disagreements over the distribution of a commodity or its derivative wealth, all of which 
may increase the likelihood of one or more sides engaging in violent or contentious 
behavior increases.48 Additionally, the potential gains associated with theft and looting 
increase as wealth increases.49 Overall, increased agricultural production may shift the 
opportunity costs in favor of participating in violent activities while simultaneously 
providing the necessary means to sustain resource intensive activities such as civil war 
and insurgency.50 As Napoléon once suggested, “an army marches on its stomach.”51 In 
line with this rationale, several studies examining the connection between deviations to 
long term precipitation patterns and the onset of civil conflict indicate that wetter than 
normal years are more likely to increase the probability of civil conflict.52  
D. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION IN AFRICA 
Climate change-induced fluctuations in precipitation are likely to have a 
significant impact on the Africa’s overall agricultural sector. Inadequate water storage 
and irrigation infrastructure leave 95 percent of the continent’s agricultural production 
dependent upon direct rainfall.53 The IPCC AR5 reports with high confidence that current 
                                                 
48 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 625–633, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277551; Macartan Humphreys, 
“Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4: 508–537, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277545; Cullen Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and 
Empirical Implications for the Study of Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–285, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310361838; Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton, “The Devil is in the 
Details,”188; Raleigh and Kniveton, “Come Rain or Shine,” 54; Katharina Wick and Erwin H. Bulte, 
“Contesting Resources: Rent Seeking, Conflict and the Natural Resource Curse,” Public Choice 128, no. 
3/4 (September 2006): 457–476, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25487568. 
49 Witsenburg and Adano, “Of Rain and Raids,” 514. 
50 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” 36 and 45; 
Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton, “The Devil is in the Details,”188–189. 
51 “An army marches on its stomach,” The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, Encyclopedia.com, 
accessed October 13, 2017, http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-
and-press-releases/army-marches-its-stomach. 
52 Buhaug, “Climate Not to Blame,” Model 7; Marshall Burke et al., “Climate and Civil War: Is the 
Relationship Robust,” NBER Working Paper 16440, (October 2010): Table 3, Model 3, 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w16440; Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in 
Africa,” 42–43. 
53 DOD, Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security, xii. 
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climate change projections will have an overall negative impact on cereal crop yields 
over large sections of the Africa.54 Maize production, for example, is expected to drop 18 
percent over southern Africa by mid-century and wheat production could shrink by as 
much as 35 percent across the sub-Saharan region.55 Likewise, suitable growing 
conditions for several high-value crops (coffee, tea, cocoa, and cotton) are expected to 
diminish.56 The effects of climate change on other non-cereal crops range across the 
positive and negative spectrum depending on the particular crop and location.57 With 
regards to livestock production, reductions in precipitation are likely to have a two-fold 
impact with drought conditions decreasing the availability of feed crops and, 
simultaneously, water supplies for animals as scarce water is redirected for crop 
irrigation.58 Combined, the current body of research predicts the overall impact of climate 
change on agricultural production across much of Africa to be negative.59   
The potential for reduced food production within the African continent is 
particularly alarming given that food insecurity is already a major problem for much of 
the population.60 Household surveys estimate that as much as 59 percent of the 
population in 12 African countries is food insecure with more conservative estimates still 
hovering upwards of 39 percent.61 The IPCC AR5 identifies food related issues in four of 
its nine climate change related key risk areas for Africa with medium to high risk 
estimated for all four.62 These risks are further exacerbated by multiple institutional and 
                                                 
54 Niang et al., “Africa,” 1218.  
55 Ibid., 1218. 
56 Ibid., 1219. 
57 Ibid., 1218–1219. 
58 Ibid., 1219–1220. 
59 John R. Porter et al., “Food Security and Food Production Systems,” in Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Chris B. Field et al. 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 488. 
60 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Near East and North Africa Regional 
Overview of Food Insecurity 2016 Cairo: FAO, 2017: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6860e.pdf. 
61 Porter et al., “Food Security and Food Production Systems,” 490. 
62 Niang et al., “Africa,” 1237–1238. 
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societal barriers that reduce the potential for the development and implementation of 
adaptive solutions to changing climates at the local and regional scale.63 
  
                                                 
63 Ibid., 1236. 
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III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A. CONNECTING THE CONFLICT DOTS 
Unfortunately, a fundamental evidence gap within the climate change-conflict 
debate persists with regards to connecting individual climatological factors with an 
assortment of proposed intermediate social, political, and economic linkages necessary to 
construct a more meaningful causal chain. A large swath of the current research discussed 
focuses primarily on establishing direct correlations between conflict and a slew of 
dependent variables located almost exclusively on the left-most or right-most end of the 
causal chain. On the left-most end are those studies that seek to establish a direct 
correlation between historic deviations in meteorological conditions and the onset of 
violent conflict. For example, it is often argued that, as noted above, an increased 
frequency of large fluctuations in precipitation due to climate change will, in turn, lead to 
more conflict. Likewise, studies focusing on the right-hand side of the causal chain 
highlight the role of food insecurity, a commonly proposed proxy for climate change, as a 
threat multiplier for the onset of conflict. There are, however, few meaningful attempts to 
flesh out the various indirect and interactive mechanisms occurring in between the 
meteorological variables on the left and the various indicators of food insecurity on the 
right that likely influence an environment of instability typically associated with the onset 
of conflict. 
B. FOREIGN FOOD DEPENDENCE—A THREAT REDUCER? 
Given the interconnected nature of precipitation and food production, there is a 
somewhat logical tendency to assume that the two phenomena are directly correlated. 
Likewise, the scarcity and abundance theories discussed in the previous chapter illustrate 
the logic behind a prevailing notion that climate change-induced fluctuations in the 
agricultural sector have the potential to drive societies toward conflict with food supply 
as a would-be vehicle. Piecing together the current literature suggests the following 
potential rudimentary causal pathway between climate change and conflict: significant 
deviations from long-term precipitation patterns lead to variations in agricultural 
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production impacting food supplies, which, in turn, influences the propensity for 
individuals and groups to engage in contentious and violent behavior. If accurate, a 
confluence of tenuous social, political, economic, and environmental factors leaves much 
of Africa particularly vulnerable at virtually every stage along this causal chain. 
This proposal, however, relies heavily on the presumption that a country’s overall 
food supply is purely or, at the very least, predominantly dependent upon domestic food 
production and fails to take into account an individual country’s ability and/or 
willingness to adjust import, export, and utilization practices in order to compensate for 
windfalls and shortfalls in production. Additionally, receipt of large foreign food aid, 
although problematic in its own right, may insulate a nation’s overall food supply when 
faced with downturns in domestic production. Much of the climate change-conflict 
research tends to make the immediate leap from meteorological conditions, such as 
rainfall, to the onset of conflict with little or no consideration as to whether phenomena 
such as precipitation shocks have an actual effect on the overall supply of food within a 
given nation’s borders. At the same time, studies examining food as a potential 
intermediate variable focus primarily on food prices—a metric that is often far more 
volatile than simple supply-demand curves might suggest.64 Generally speaking, the bulk 
of the climate change-conflict research has yet to systematically account for the assorted 
methods individual countries employ to manage and secure their domestic food 
supplies—some of which are directly impacted by precipitation and some of which are 
not. Instead, they assume the correlation between rainfall and food supply is universal 
across both arid and damp climates. In order to apply either the resource scarcity theory 
or abundance theory to the above causal pathway, deviations in country’s precipitation 
and food supply should coincide if one is to consider food as the presumptive resource 
affecting the incidence of conflict. As such, an initial hypothesis of this thesis is: 
                                                 
64 Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton, “The Devil is in the Details,” 189–190; Smith, “Feeding Unrest,” 
679–682. 
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H1: Food supplies are directly linked to deviations in normal precipitation 
patterns with wetter than normal years yielding higher than normal food supplies and 
drier than normal years having the opposite effect. 
Given the diverse economic and environmental conditions that exist across the 
African continent, it is highly unlikely that any climate change-food supply-conflict 
relationship will apply uniformly across both net food importers and net food producers 
alike. A country such as Algeria, for example, relies heavily on foreign imports to 
maintain its domestic food supply and is, consequently, one of the world’s largest 
importers of wheat.65 Although the relative impact on Algeria’s domestic gross food 
production in the wake of a significant precipitation shock could just as easily mirror 
those felt by countries with more robust agricultural sectors, one would expect the 
resulting effect on Algeria’s net food supply to be much lower given its domestic food 
production represents a relatively small portion of its overall food supply equation. A 
similar dampening effect should also hold when applied to the abundance theory of 
resource-derived conflict. Following better than average crop yields, the opportunity for 
rent-seeking behavior and increased resource pools to fund and supply insurgencies 
should remain comparatively low for import-dependent countries, such as Algeria, given 
that agriculture represents a relatively small portion of their overall economy. 
Conversely, a nation such as Mali, which relies almost exclusively on domestic 
production for its supply of cereal-based foods, would appear to be at a much greater risk 
of suffering catastrophic food shortages in the wake of unfavorable growing conditions. 
Countries that are unaccustomed to relying on the large-scale importation of food may 
suffer from a lack of established international distribution chains, trade agreements, and 
foreign aid packages which, when combined with the additional transportation costs and 
delivery times associated with importing a commodity, as opposed to producing it at 
home, leave them less able to adapt and respond to sudden fluctuations in meteorological 
conditions.  
                                                 
65 “Algeria - Agricultural Sector,” International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
last published June 15, 2016, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Algeria-Agricultural-Sector.  
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As such, one might expect the effects of deviations in normal precipitation 
patterns on the incidence of conflict to vary when controlling for disparities in each 
individual country’s dependence of foreign food sources. By failing to account for these 
dissimilarities, there is a risk that the potential effects of climate change on the incidence 
of conflict will be understated for countries that are heavily dependent on domestic food 
production and overstated for those countries that rely more deeply on foreign sources to 
feed their populations. Attempts to apply a one-size-fits-all approach to mitigating the 
potential negative consequences of climate change will likely lead to the inefficient use 
of limited resources. The availability of financial capital is particularly scarce across the 
African continent with only four African nations maintaining a gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita above than the global average.66 Therefore, it is imperative that 
individual mitigation strategies are developed in order to address the specific 
vulnerabilities of each individual nation, food security for example, to ensure that 
intervention plans remain cost effective. Thus, the main hypothesis of this thesis is:  
H2: Countries with a higher dependence on foreign food sources will exhibit a 
lower frequency of conflict directly following significant deviations in normal 
precipitation patterns. 
  
                                                 
66 World Bank/World Development Indicators, (object name WDI (Excel)-ZIP; accessed on 
November 1, 2017), http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODS 
A. PRECIPITATION AND CONFLICT REVISITED 
In a study typical of the large-N analysis dominating much of the current climate 
change-conflict research, Hendrix and Salehyan examine the effects of precipitation 
shocks on the incidence of both civil war and social conflict on 47 African countries with 
populations greater than one million.67 They find that extremely wet years increase the 
likelihood of civil conflict whereas both abnormally wet and dry years increase the risk of 
social conflict across Africa. This chapter reanalyzes their data controlling for the 
different methods a country uses to secure its food supply in order to test the resource 
scarcity and abundance theory based hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. The 
following analysis is conducted in two separate phases with the initial phase focused on 
Hypothesis 1, located along the left-hand side of the proposed causal chain. This 
preliminary phase examines whether extreme deviations from normal precipitation 
patterns actually alter the overall supply of food available within a given country. The 
second phase of analysis shifts further right along the causal chain to evaluate Hypothesis 
2 in an attempt to determine whether a country’s dependence on foreign food sources 
changes the overall risk of conflict in the wake of anomalously wet and dry years. 
B. BASELINE DATA 
1. Precipitation Data 
For all models, Hendrix and Salehyan utilize the annual standardized rainfall 
deviation as their independent variable measured at the country level. To calculate this 
standardized deviation, the authors subtract the annual precipitation for a given country 
from its long-term (1979-2008) panel mean and then divide it by the standard deviation 
of that panel. Additionally, the authors include the squared term of the standardized 
deviation in their models as a test for potential curvilinear relationships. Lastly, their 
models also include lagged versions of both the linear and squared terms. Rainfall data is 
                                                 
67 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa.” 
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from the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) database version 2.1 and is 
based on measurements collected by both rain gauges and remote sensing.68 The potential 
for endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables is virtually nil given 
that conflict, in any form, cannot affect the amount of rainfall a country receives in the 
timeframe measured for their study. The authors, however, may underestimate the risk of 
omitted variable bias based on the potential impact temperature has on both conflict and 
precipitation.69 
2. Conflict Data 
Hendrix and Salehyan utilize a dummy variable of 1 as the dependent variable for 
civil conflict onset when an intrastate conflict for a given country-year exceeds a battle 
death threshold of 25; all other country-years are represented by 0. The authors collected 
data for civil conflict from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.70 For social conflict 
data, Hendrix and Salehyan use a count of the number of social conflict events occurring 
during a given country-year extracted from the Social Conflict in Africa Database 
(SCAD).71 In addition to examining the total number of social conflict events as a whole, 
the authors present four additional models for the following subcategories: nonviolent 
events, violent events, government-targeted events, and non-government-targeted 
events.72 
 
                                                 
68 Robert F. Adler, George J. Huffman, and David Bolvin, Global Precipitation Climatology Project - 
Daily, Version 2.1 (Silver Springs, MD: NOAA National Climatic Data Center, 2011). 
69 For temperature and conflict connections see Burke et al., “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil 
War in Africa.”; John O’Loughlin et al., “Climate Variability and Conflict Risk in East Africa, 1990–
2009,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109, no. 45 
(2012): 18344–18349, http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1205130109. For temperature and precipitation see Peter 
Berg, Christopher Moseley and Jan O. Haerter, “Strong Increase in Convective Precipitation in Response to 
Higher Temperatures,” Nature Geoscience 6 (2013): 181–185, https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo1731. 
70 Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace 
Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039005007. 
71 Idean Salehyan et al., “Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database,” International Interactions 38, 
no. 4 (2012): 503–511, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.697426. 
72 Refer to SCAD codebook and Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social 
Conflict in Africa,” for a full description of the various event types. 
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3. Controls  
Consistent with the prevailing conflict literature, Hendrix and Salehyan apply a 
host of political, economic, and demographic controls to their conflict models. Based on 
previous studies that find an inverted curvilinear effect between regime type and conflict, 
the authors use the Polity score (Polity2) along with its squared term to control for regime 
type. For example, Hegre et al. and Muller and Weede find that civil war and social 
conflict are lower for states that are either highly democratic or highly authoritarian.73 
Development and economic growth are controlled for using real gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita (log) and real GDP growth (%) with prior studies linking higher levels 
of economic prosperity with decreases in the likelihood of both civil war and social 
conflict.74 Measures of population (log) and population growth are also included given 
that larger populations are more likely to experience political protests with rapid growth 
linked to increased political disorder.75 Data for the above economic and population 
indicators are pulled from the Penn World Table version 6.3.76 Lastly, the authors control 
for the incidence of civil conflict in their social conflict models due to concerns that civil 
conflict may suppress participation in and reporting of lower levels of contentious 
behavior or, conversely, may actually exacerbate large-scale protests.77  
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Resolution 50, no. 6 (2006): 937–961, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706289303; Cullen S. Hendrix, 
Stephan Haggard, and Beatriz Magaloni, “Grievance and Opportunity: Food Prices, Political Regime, and 
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C. FOOD-RELATED VARIABLES 
As part of their mission to defeat world hunger, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations collects and publishes a wide range of food 
security related data that provide the basis for the following analyses.78 Although robust 
in terms of the variety of domains available, incongruences in the categorization of 
FAO’s food metrics can make meaningful calculations across production, trade, and 
supply statistics rather difficult. Additionally, variations in the caloric density of different 
foods render direct comparisons of aggregated food metrics, typically measured in 
tonnes, somewhat meaningless when examined across multiple countries whose diets and 
agricultural sectors are all unique. Likewise, attempts to compare subcategories (meat, 
dairy, fruit, etc.) are equally problematic as many of FAO’s groupings often fail to align 
in the exact aggregation of items across the various production, trade, and supply 
domains.  
To overcome these limitations, this thesis focuses on cereal foods as a proxy for 
overall food supplies. FAO’s labeling and aggregation for cereal foods remain largely 
consistent across all three domains allowing for more direct comparisons across 
countries. Moreover, cereal based foods are often considered a mainstay of most basic 
diets and represent a relatively high percentage of the overall food supply across Africa in 
terms of caloric intake. For the panel years 1989–2008, the median percentage of total 
food supply (kcal/capita/day) derived from cereals was 50% across 839 country-year data 
points with a standard deviation of 14.68%.79 Cereal foods represent over half of the total 
food supply (kcal/capita/day) for 49% of all country-years observed and at least one-third 
of the total food supply for 88% of the country-year observations. As such, cereal foods 
provide a reasonable substitute for overall food when testing food security related issues 
                                                 
78 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAOSTAT. (Rome, Italy: FAO, May 17, 
2017). http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data. 
79 Percentage calculations based on Food supply (kcal/capita/day) element values for Cereals – 
Excluding Beer + (Total) over Grand Total + (Total) items aggregated within the Food Supply – Crops 
Primary Equivalent domain. Data not available for Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Libya, 
or Somalia. 
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as potential intermediate linkages between climate change and conflict. Tables 1 and 2 
summarize descriptive statistics for cereal foods as a percentage of overall food supply. 
Table 1.   Country-year cereal supply and overall food supply for 42 African 
countries, 1989–2000 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cereal supply 
(kcal/capita/day) 
839 1138.10 1131 419.28 219 2231 
Food supply 
(kcal/capita/day) 
839 2321.96 2235 388.86 1508 3490 
Cereals as a % of 
overall food supply 
839 48.55% 50% 14.68% 13% 78% 
* Data not available for Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia. 
Table 2.   Quartile breakdown of cereals as a percentage of overall food supply 
for 42 African countries, 1989–2008 
Variable Obs. 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
No. of country-years  839 98 328 395 18 
 
To be clear, the kilocalorie/capita/day data for cereal supply and overall food 
supply provided by FAO are meant to represent the supply of “processed commodities 
potentially available for human consumption” and, therefore, one should not construe 
these figures as representative of the actual caloric intake of foods consumed (in mouth) 
at the household level.80 These figures have, however, proven suitable for estimating 
                                                 
80 “Food Balance Sheets and the Food Consumption Survey: A Comparison of Methodologies and 




national level surpluses and shortages of food supplies within individual countries—a 
metric that remains crucial to the resource scarcity and abundance theories.81 
Data for the annual totals of cereal produced domestically, imported, exported and 
received as aid are extracted for each country-year (47 countries, 1989-2008).82 
Quantities are measured in tonnes and represent only those crops harvested as dry grains. 
Fodder crops (forage, silage, and grazing) and crops harvested for industrial purposes are 
excluded. Models are run utilizing standardized deviations of all four measures, which 
are derived by calculating the deviation from the long-term (1989-2008) panel mean 
value for a given country and dividing it by the standard deviation of that country’s panel. 
Utilizing a standardized deviation measure in lieu of actual measured values reduces the 
cross-sectional differences within the individual variables. Observed values of cereal 
production, for example, range from 177 tonnes for the Mauritius-2003 country-year to 
30,209,000 tonnes for Nigeria-2008. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for these 
figures. 
Table 3.   Standardized deviations for cereal production, cereal imports, cereal 
exports, and cereal aid for 47 African countries, 1989–2000 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cereal production 935 0.00 -0.09 1.00 -2.94 3.08 
Cereal imports 935 0.00 -0.19 1.00 -2.55 3.20 
Cereal exports   9151 0.00 -0.30 0.97 -1.69 4.36 
Cereal aid2  935 0.00 -0.28 1.00 -1.89 4.36 
1 Export data for Mauritania not available. 
2 The FAO database retrieves cereal aid data for 795 country-year observations. A zero values are 
substituted for the remaining 140 missing values to limit list-wide deletion of country years.  
                                                 
81 Rafael Balanza et al., “Trends in Food Availability Determined by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s Food Balance Sheets in Mediterranean Europe in Comparison with other European Areas,” 
Public Health Nutrition 10, no. 2 (2007): 168-176, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1368980007246592; Samia 
Zekaria Gutu, Simon Maxwell, and Rachel Lambert, Cereal, Pulse and Oilseed Balance Sheet Analysis for 
Ethiopia, 1979-1989 (Brighton, England: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1990); 
Lluis Serra-Majem, “Food Availability and Consumption at National, Household and Individual Levels: 
Implications for Food-based Dietary Guidelines Development,” Public Health Nutrition 4, no. 2 (2001): 
673-676, https://doi.org/10.1079/PHN2001152. 
82 Export data not available for Mauritania. 
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To model the effects of precipitation shocks on food supply, a measure of annual 
cereal supply (measured in tonnes) is constructed using the following equation: cereal 
production + cereal imports + cereal aid – cereal exports.83 Again, standardized 
deviations are constructed using the method noted above to reduce cross-sectional 
differences. Descriptive statistics for cereal supply standardized deviation measures are 
summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Standardized deviations for cereal supply and overall food supply for 
46 African countries, 1989–2000 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cereal supply 
(tonnes)1 
915 0.00 -0.13 1.00 -2.40 3.09 
1Cereal supply not calculated for Mauritania due to missing export data. 
 
To estimate a country’s dependence on foreign cereal supplies, a foreign-source 
dependency ratio (FDR) is constructed for each country-year. The FDR is calculated by 
dividing the sum of a country’s foreign cereal sources (imports and aid) by its net 
availability of cereal (production + imports + aid – exports) and then multiplying the 
quotient by 100.84 One caveat to this ratio is the assumption that inbound supplies are 
used for domestic consumption and are not re-exported out of the country. Higher 
dependence ratios represent greater dependence on outside food sources. A ratio over 
                                                 
83 Production data is pulled from the Production – Crops domain, Cereals, Total + (Total) items 
aggregated, Production Quantity group. Import and export data is pulled from the Trade – Crops and 
Livestock domain, Cereals, + (Total) items aggregated, Import/Export Quantity groups. Cereal aid data is 
pulled from the Emergency Response – Food Aid Shipments (WFP) domain, Cereals item. Missing values 
for production, import, and export data are classified as such leading to the entire country-year being 
removed from the supply analysis if any one of the three measures are missing. For example, no export data 
for Mauritania is available and subsequent analysis does not include cereal supply calculations for that 
country. Missing values for cereal aid, however, are interpreted as zero with no country-years removed 
from analysis.  
84 FAO calculates an import dependency ratio (IDR) utilizing a similar formula without the inclusion 
of aid which, for some countries, represents a significant portion of their cereal supply. However, FAO 
only provides IDR data for the years 2000 and later which fails to overlap with a large portion of the 
Hendrix and Salehyan study. Additionally, FAO provide their IDR figures as a three-year centered average 
and, therefore, is not conducive for examining the impact of annual shocks.  
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50% indicates the majority of a country’s cereal supply is obtained via foreign sources for 
that given year.  
For most African countries, the majority of their cereal supplies are derived from 
domestic production with 642 country-years maintaining a FDR below 50%. This, 
however, still leaves almost a third of the country-years observed where foreign sources 
constitute the majority of the country’s cereal supply for that year. Additionally, 13 
countries maintain a mean FDR greater than 50% for all panel years observed (1989-
2008), with five maintaining a mean FDR over 75%. Refer to Tables 5-7 for descriptive 
statistics.  
Table 5.   FDRs for 46 African countries, 1989–2008 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
FDR1 915 37.15% 29% 28.24% 1 124%* 
1 FDR not calculated for Mauritania due to missing export data. 
* Mauritius is the only country that displays an FDR over 100 and does so for all panel years. 
One possible explanation for their outlier status may be a result of their geography as an island 
nation. Cereal production requires relatively large plots of land and, as such, Mauritius produces 
almost no cereals. They do, however, import large quantities of cereal foods and, subsequently, 
export more than they produce. This is likely the of result of reprocessing raw cereals into a 
secondary exportable good or, perhaps, due to more complex trade mechanics occurring at their 
port that are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Table 6.   Count of country-years broken down into FDR quartile ranges for 46 
African countries, 1989–2008 
 No. of country years by dependency ratio ranges  
Variable Obs. 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% >100% 
FDR 915 403 239 143 112   18 
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D. EFFECTS OF PRECIPITATION ON FOOD SUPPLY 
Linear regressions are used to determine the impact of precipitation shocks 
(independent variable) on a several indicators of food supply (dependent variables) with 
errors clustered at the country level. Given that most cereal foods maintain a relatively 
long shelf life, regressions are run using both contemporaneous and lagged independent 
variables to capture potential carryover of inventories cultivated during the previous year. 
Although a positive-linear correlation between precipitation and food supply seems the 
most logical relationship, the squared-terms of both the same-year and lagged 
independent variables are also included to account for any potential curvilinear affects 
that may arise due to crop loss, spoilage, and loss of distribution capacity as a result of 
inundation and flooding during extremely wet years. Odd numbered models correspond 
to direct linear regressions without applying additional controls for precipitation and 
cereal production (Model 1), cereal imports (Model 3), cereal exports (Model 5), cereal 
supply (Model 7), and overall food supply (Model 9). Even numbered models include the 
political, economic, and demographic controls described above. 
Coefficients estimating the effects of precipitation shocks on the various food 
supply variables are summarized in Table 8 As expected, there is a positive-linear 
relationship between same-year rainfall deviations and cereal production. The linear 
effect is strong and statistically significant (p < 0.01) when analyzed based on 
precipitation alone (Model 1) and remains so with the addition of the standard conflict 
controls (Model 2), although there is a slight reduction in the coefficient estimate from 
0.163 to 0.152. Regime type, GDP per capita, and GDP growth also display a positive, 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), linear relationship, with higher levels of democracy, 
economic output, and economic growth associated with increased cereal yields. There is 
also evidence (p < 0.05) for an inverted curvilinear effect between regime type, however, 
the slope of this relationship is relatively flat. Overall, these results suggest that wetter 
than normal years do, in fact, produce better than average yields for cereal foods. 
Given that imports are often intended fill the demand gap left by shortfalls in 
domestic production, one might expect the opposite relationship (a negative-linear 
correlation) between present rainfall and imports based on the previously discussed link 
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between production and rainfall. Surprisingly, however, present rainfall appears to have 
little effect on cereal import levels (Models 3 and 4). The previous year’s rainfall, on the 
other hand, does display a strong and statistically significant (p < 0.01) negative 
correlation (Model 3) that strengthens once the host of controls are applied (Model 4), as 
indicated by a change in the coefficient estimate from -0.105 to -0.124. This finding 
suggests that many African nations actively adjust their import practices based on 
production levels, the effects of which, however, are not realized until the following year. 
A possible explanation for this delay is market and distribution limitations that cause with 
a temporal lag between the placement of import orders and the actual delivery of goods. 
For example, countries experiencing lower than normal precipitation and, as a 
consequent, lower cereal yields will attempt to offset the gap by increasing foreign import 
orders. However, due to availability, bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of transportation 
infrastructure, etc., the bulk of these import orders are not delivered until the following 
year. A positive coefficient for the squared-term of the lagged rainfall variable, both with 
(0.062, p < 0.01) and without the applied controls (0.070, p < 0.01), suggest that this 
relationship is curvilinear in shape becoming stronger following drier than normal years.  
There is little evidence that either present or previous year rainfall has any effect 
on cereal exports (Models 5 and 6). This lack of correlation is, however, not all that 
surprising given that most African countries are net food importers and, therefore, often 
import large quantities of cereal in order to meet domestic demand (Tables 5-7). Several 
counties have even gone so far as to implement outright bans on the exportation of 
cereals.85 As a result, most countries are likely to utilize any increase in production 
associated with wetter than normal years to help satisfy domestic demand versus 
attempting to expand their export market. 
The relationship between cereal aid deliveries and deviations in precipitation 
mirrors that of cereal imports (Models 7 and 8). Previous year precipitation and foreign 
aid display a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.090, p < 0.01) that 
                                                 
85 Manitra A. Rakotoarisoa Massimo Iafrate, and Marianna Paschali, Why has Africa Become a Net 
Food Importer? (Rome, Italy: Trade and Markets Division, Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011): 51. 
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strengthens under the applied controls (-0.106, p < 0.01). A potential source for this 
lagged response might include delays identifying the need for aid, particularly in more 
remote regions outside the urban centers that then become exacerbated as the request 
gradually proceeds through multiple bureaucracies that, combined with availability and 
transportation constraints, push delivery dates into the following year. 
Congruent with the previous findings, there is also strong evidence that 
precipitation shocks have a statistically significant (p < 0.01) effect on cereal supplies 
(Models 9 and 10). Interestingly, with the standard controls applied (Model 10), the 
larger absolute value of the coefficient estimate reported for lagged linear deviations in 
rainfall (-0.121) and food supply compared to the coefficient estimate for present 
deviations in rainfall (0.102) suggest that the cumulative effects of imports and aid on 
overall cereal supplies surpass those of cereal production. Regime type and GDP growth 
are also significant at p < 0.01 with GDP per capita significant at p < 0.05, the effects of 
which are all positively correlated. 
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Table 8.   Rainfall deviations and food supply deviations, 1990–2008 without controls and 1991–2008 with controls 
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Variables Cereal Production  Cereal Imports  Cereal Exports  Cereal Aid  Cereal Supply 
Rainfall Deviation  0.163***  0.152***  -0.020 -0.025   0.008 -0.011  -0.079* -0.070   0.114***  0.102*** 
 (0.049) (0.046)  (0.036) (0.041)  (0.034) (0.036)  (0.045) (0.046)  (0.038) (0.035) 
Rainfall Deviation²  0.021  0.018   0.032  0.036  -0.023 -0.021   0.015  0.025   0.029  0.030 
 (0.030) (0.028)  (0.027) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.030) (0.026) 
Rainfall Deviation, lagged -0.022 -0.026  -0.105*** -0.124***   0.004  0.001  -0.090*** -0.106***  -0.101** -0.121*** 
 (0.040) (0.038)  (0.035) (0.036)  (0.033) (0.032)  (0.032) (0.037)  (0.040) (0.039) 
Rainfall Deviation², lagged  0.041 -0.004   0.062***  0.070***   0.010  0.001   0.004  0.029   0.064**  0.048* 
 (0.030) (0.026)  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.044) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.026) 
Polity2   0.022***    0.023***    0.003   -0.010    0.028*** 
  (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008) 
Polity2²  -0.005**   -0.003   -0.001    0.001   -0.004** 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
log Population   0.035    0.034*    0.004   -0.009    0.038 
  (0.025)   (0.020)   (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.026) 
Population growth   0.461   -3.384   -0.996    0.768   -1.433 
  (1.526)   (3.035)   (1.353)   (1.791)   (1.600) 
log Real GDP per capita   0.105***    0.041    0.067**   -0.045*    0.085** 
  (0.035)   (0.036)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.040) 
Real GDP growth, %   0.014***    0.008*    0.006   -0.006    0.015*** 
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Constant -0.052 -1.033***  -0.038 -0.518   0.026 -0.466*  -0.025  0.322  -0.050 -0.931** 
 (0.054) (0.377)  (0.045) (0.381)  (0.031) (0.268)  (0.044) (0.290)  (0.050) (0.418) 
Observations   889   828    889   828    870   810    889   828    870   810 
Countries    47    47     47    47     46    46     47    47     46    46 
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Combined, this evidence supports Hypothesis 1 that deviations from precipitation 
patterns do, in fact, affect cereal supplies. Additionally, these findings indicate that, based 
on the larger coefficient estimate for previous versus present rainfall deviations, 
fluctuations in rainfall occurring the previous year actually have a greater impact on 
cereal supplies—a phenomena not previously discussed in the bulk of climate change-
conflict research. This lag effect has the potential to exacerbate food security conditions 
both in the positive and negative direction. Higher than normal harvests, as the result of 
wetter than normal condition, will lead to lower levels of import orders—the impact of 
which are not felt until the following year. If a wetter than normal year is immediately 
followed by a drought year, both production and import levels could end up significantly 
lower leading to extreme food shortages. Conversely, a drought year followed by a wetter 
than normal year has the potential to create larges surpluses that may contribute to a 
number of conflict inducing behaviors associated with the abundance theory of conflict.  
E. EFFECT OF FOREIGN FOOD DEPENDENCE ON PRECIPITATION-
INDUCED CONFLICT 
To determine whether a country’s dependence on foreign-sourced cereals alters 
the broader linkage between climate change-induced fluctuations in precipitation and the 
incidence of conflict, a reanalysis of Hendrix and Salehyan’s conflict models is 
conducted with countries separated into two groups—those that rely heavily on foreign 
cereal sources (FDR > 50%) and those who produce the majority of their cereal foods 
domestically (FDR < 50%). Because Hendrix and Salehyan’s original models yield 
significant findings for contemporaneous rainfall but not the previous year’s rainfall, 
lagged FDRs are utilized to limit potential multicollinearity given that rainfall affects 
both conflict and FDR (via its effect on cereal production).  
Hendrix and Salehyan’s original model for measuring the impact of precipitation 
shocks on the incidence of civil conflict uses logistic regression with errors clustered at 
the country level and a cubic polynomial approach for interpreting time dependence of 
years since the last conflict. Controls are applied using their lagged measures. The model 
is run on a sample of 47 countries for the years 1991-2008 with a total of 828 country-
year observations. Table 9 reports the replicated results of Hendrix and Salehyan’s 
 35 
original civil conflict model (Model 11). The authors find a statistically significant (p < 
0.01) positive, linear relationship between present rainfall deviations and the onset of 
civil war and insurgency. Population growth is the only standard control within their 
model to show an impact (p < 0.05) on civil conflict with higher rates of growth 
increasing the probability of conflict. Overall, their findings suggest that civil war is more 
likely to occur during wetter than normal conditions. 
To facilitate side-by-side comparisons, Table 9 also includes the reanalysis results 
of the civil conflict models separated by FDR. Model 12 is run for countries with a FDR 
less than 50% (n=562), while Model 13 includes those countries with a FDR greater than 
50% (n=266). For countries that produce the majority of their cereal supplies 
domestically, the present effect of rainfall shocks on civil conflict strengthens when 
compared to the original model showing an increase in the coefficient estimate from 
0.405 to 0.478, statistically significant at p < 0.01. The linear effect remains positive with 
wetter than normal years increasing the probability of civil conflict. For countries that 
rely heavily on foreign sources to maintain their cereal supplies, the statistical 
significance between precipitation shocks and civil conflict completely disappears. 
These findings support Hypothesis 2, which suggests that dependence on foreign 
cereal sources dampen the effects of precipitation shocks on the incidence of civil 
conflict. In fact, for countries that import the majority of their annual cereal supplies, the 
connection between rainfall and civil conflict all but evaporates. Furthermore, the 
strengthening of the positive relationship between rainfall and civil conflict for countries 
with relatively low FDRs further supports Hypothesis 2. Additionally, this strong positive 
relationship gives credence to the abundance theory of conflict, which argues that 
bountiful harvests can provide the necessary resources to recruit, feed, and fund 
insurgencies while also providing potential grievances over the distribution of wealth 
derived from increased yields.  
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Table 9.   Rainfall deviations and civil conflict separated by FDR, 1991–2008 
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 








FDR < 50% 
 (13) 
Lagged 
FDR > 50% 
Variables Civil conflict onset 
Lagged dependent variable  -2.494***   -2.927***   -3.227*** 
  (0.689)   (0.715)   (1.036) 
Rainfall deviation   0.405***    0.478***    0.344 
  (0.156)   (0.172)   (0.216) 
Rainfall deviation²  -0.077   -0.194    0.010 
  (0.069)   (0.144)   (0.076) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged  -0.101   -0.255    0.210 
  (0.151)   (0.193)   (0.181) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged  -0.043    0.021   -0.356 
  (0.088)   (0.073)   (0.357) 
Polity2, lagged   0.013    0.014   -0.010 
  (0.031)   (0.042)   (0.073) 
Polity2², lagged  -0.010    0.002   -0.029*** 
  (0.009)   (0.014)   (0.008) 
log Population, lagged   0.079   -0.066    0.584** 
  (0.110)   (0.174)   (0.242) 
Population growth, lagged   0.014**    0.006    0.018*** 
  (0.006)   (0.021)   (0.006) 
log Real GDP per capita, lagged  -0.191   -0.647    0.031 
  (0.288)   (0.424)   (0.327) 
Real GDP growth, %, lagged  -0.004   -0.032**   -0.756** 
  (0.010)   (0.018)   (0.013) 
Constant  -0.425    4.235   -4.717 
  (2.157)   (2.862)   (2.251) 
Controls for temporal dependence      Yes       Yes       Yes 
Observations      828       562       266 
Countries       47        41        25 
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Shifting to social conflict, Hendrix and Salehyan model the effects of 
precipitation shocks on several categories of social conflict using negative binomial 
regression estimated on the pooled time time-series cross-sectional.86 Standard errors are 
clustered on countries and controls are applied using their present measures. Year 
dummies are also included in their models to control for broader conditions that may 
affect social conflict levels across all countries in the same given year. Their social 
conflict models are run on a sample that includes 46 countries for the years 1991-2007 
with 765 country-year observations.87 
Replication results for their original models are included in the left-hand column 
models of Tables 10-14.88 The authors find a curvilinear U-shaped relationship between 
both positive and negative deviations for contemporaneous rainfall, based on the squared 
term, and social conflict for total social conflict events (Table 10, Model 14) and all four 
of the social conflict subcategories: nonviolent (Table 11, Model 17), violent (Table 12, 
Model 20), government-targeted (Table 13, Model 23), and non-government-targeted 
events (Table 14, Model 26). These findings are statistically significant at p < 0.01 for all 
but non-government-targeted events (p < 0.05). When comparing the marginal effects of 
present rainfall deviation, the authors also find that violent events are more likely to 
occur during wetter than normal years. 
 
  
                                                 
86 The authors also run their social conflict models using conditional country fixed effects as a 
robustness check, however, this thesis is primarily concerned with comparing the results of the time-series 
cross-sectional models with the additional FDR controls. The results of Hendrix and Salehyan’s conditional 
country fixed effects largely confirm their time-series cross-sectional findings. For a complete summary of 
their results please refer to the original study. 
87 Hendrix and Salehyan drop Somalia due to its lack of functioning government and conflict 
attributed to foreign intervention.  
88 When replicating Hendrix and Salehyan’s original social conflict models, all coefficient estimates 
matched those published in their paper except for time trend and the constant. Estimates reported in the 
attached models (odd numbered models located in Tables 9-13) represent data extracted during the 
replication attempts. 
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Table 10.   Cereal supply and total social conflict events separated by FDR, 
1991–2007  
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 






FDR < 50% 
 (16) 
Lagged  
FDR > 50% 
Variables Total events 
Lagged dependent variable   0.049***    0.042***    0.065*** 
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.012) 
Rainfall deviation  -0.015    0.025   -0.097 
  (0.032)   (0.037)   (0.063) 
Rainfall deviation²   0.072***    0.069***    0.108*** 
  (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.041) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged  -0.018    0.000   -0.076 
  (0.038)   (0.052)   (0.069) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged   0.015   -0.004    0.067 
  (0.028)   (0.036)   (0.048) 
Polity2  -0.015   -0.014   -0.016 
  (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.017) 
Polity2²  -0.000    0.001   -0.005 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.005) 
log Population   0.331***    0.309***    0.332*** 
  (0.062)   (0.065)   (0.110) 
Population growth, %  -4.134*   -7.981   -1.519 
  (2.112)   (6.786)   (1.464) 
log GDP per capita  -0.107    0.009   -0.153 
  (0.074)   (0.102)   (0.110) 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.012**   -0.022***   -0.001 
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.006) 
Civil conflict incidence   0.055    0.056   -0.004 
  (0.098)   (0.109)   (0.193) 
Time trend  -0.229   -0.289   -0.083 
  (0.178)   (0.182)   (0.398) 
Constant   2.905    3.498    0.545 
  (3.314)   (3.354)   (7.164) 
Observations      765       520       245 
Countries       46        40        23 
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Table 11.   Cereal supply and nonviolent social conflict events separated by FDR, 
1991–2007  
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 






FDR < 50% 
 (19) 
Lagged  
FDR > 50% 
Variables Nonviolent events 
Lagged dependent variable   0.093***    0.079***    0.124*** 
  (0.015)   (0.012)   (0.038) 
Rainfall deviation  -0.042   -0.007   -0.103* 
  (0.039)   (0.045)   (0.056) 
Rainfall deviation²   0.068***    0.068***    0.097** 
  (0.021)   (0.023)   (0.047) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged  -0.027    0.004   -0.116** 
  (0.035)   (0.046)   (0.059) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged   0.002   -0.034    0.094* 
  (0.026)   (0.031)   (0.051) 
Polity2  -0.017   -0.015   -0.018 
  (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.017) 
Polity2²   0.003    0.003    0.001 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.006) 
log Population   0.290***    0.254***    0.284** 
  (0.053)   (0.058)   (0.115) 
Population growth, %  -3.894   -6.607   -0.381 
  (2.442)   (6.383)   (1.756) 
log GDP per capita  -0.090    0.050   -0.134 
  (0.079)   (0.100)   (0.117) 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.009   -0.019***   -0.005 
  (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.005) 
Civil conflict incidence   0.123    0.136   -0.069 
  (0.095)   (0.095)   (0.233) 
Time trend  -0.349   -0.305   -0.491 
  (0.225)   (0.236)   (0.455) 
Constant   4.626    3.403    6.910 
  (4.209)   (4.564)   (8.518) 
Observations      765       520       245 
Countries       46        40        23 
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Table 12.   Cereal supply and violent social conflict events separated by FDR, 
1991–2007  
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 






FDR < 50% 
 (22) 
Lagged  
FDR > 50% 
Variables Violent events 
Lagged dependent variable   0.081***    0.072***    0.115*** 
  (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015) 
Rainfall deviation   0.032    0.077*   -0.055 
  (0.035)   (0.043)   (0.118) 
Rainfall deviation²   0.084***    0.080***    0.115** 
  (0.026)   (0.027)   (0.060) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged   0.014    0.022   -0.016 
  (0.056)   (0.072)   (0.111) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged   0.033    0.023    0.081 
  (0.040)   (0.049)   (0.073) 
Polity2  -0.003    0.000   -0.005 
  (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.024) 
Polity2²  -0.005   -0.003   -0.013** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.005) 
log Population   0.439***    0.452***    0.460*** 
  (0.075)   (0.084)   (0.176) 
Population growth, %  -4.747**   -9.412   -4.146*** 
  (2.213)   (7.781)   (1.557) 
log GDP per capita  -0.116   -0.001   -0.243** 
  (0.079)   (0.110)   (0.121) 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.017**   -0.028***   -0.008 
  (0.007)   (0.009)   (0.007) 
Civil conflict incidence  -0.046   -0.012   -0.339 
  (0.152)   (0.172)   (0.353) 
Time trend  -0.072   -0.214    0.276 
  (0.206)   (0.217)   (0.468) 
Constant  -1.513    0.105    -6.476 
  (3.620)   (3.742)   (8.252) 
Observations      765       520       245 
Countries       46        40        23 
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Table 13.   Cereal supply and government-targeted social conflict events 
separated by FDR, 1991–2007  
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 






FDR < 50% 
 (25) 
Lagged  
FDR > 50% 
Variables Government-targeted events 
Lagged dependent variable   0.091***    0.084***    0.117** 
  (0.014)   (0.011)   (0.058) 
Rainfall deviation  -0.012    0.057   -0.162** 
  (0.043)   (0.048)   (0.081) 
Rainfall deviation²   0.074***    0.055**    0.152*** 
  (0.025)   (0.024)   (0.043) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged  -0.058   -0.036   -0.134* 
  (0.042)   (0.052)   (0.070) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged  -0.003   -0.031    0.071 
  (0.029)   (0.037)   (0.061) 
Polity2  -0.016   -0.014   -0.017 
  (0.013)   (0.009)   (0.021) 
Polity2²   0.001    0.002   -0.004 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.005) 
log Population   0.276***    0.209***    0.310** 
  (0.058)   (0.055)   (0.153) 
Population growth, %  -4.733   -5.882   -1.329 
  (2.918)   (6.029)   (2.874) 
log GDP per capita  -0.105    0.029   -0.164** 
  (0.087)   (0.093)   (0.117) 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.013**   -0.026***    0.005 
  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005) 
Civil conflict incidence  -0.018   -0.021   -0.118 
  (0.107)   (0.111)   (0.256) 
Time trend  -0.284   -0.307   -0.218 
  (0.238)   (0.239)   (0.543) 
Constant   3.851    4.000    2.696 
  (4.231)   (4.366)   (9.478) 
Observations      765       520       245 
Countries       46        40        23 
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Table 14.   Cereal supply and non-government-targeted social conflict events 
separated by FDR, 1991–2007  
Robust standard errors, clustered on countries in parentheses. 






FDR < 50% 
 (28) 
Lagged  
FDR > 50% 
Variables Non-government-targeted events 
Lagged dependent variable   0.080***      0.060***   0.138*** 
  (0.019)     (0.015)   (0.043) 
Rainfall deviation   -0.023     -0.022    0.066 
  (0.037)     (0.044)   (0.079) 
Rainfall deviation²   0.072**      0.090***  -0.019 
  (0.031)     (0.029)   (0.060) 
Rainfall deviation, lagged   0.044      0.044    0.087 
  (0.049)     (0.066)   (0.082) 
Rainfall deviation², lagged   0.039      0.034    0.006 
  (0.034)     (0.035)   (0.089) 
Polity2  -0.002      0.008   -0.011 
  (0.015)     (0.015)   (0.030) 
Polity2²  -0.003     -0.003   -0.006 
  (0.003)     (0.003)   (0.005) 
log Population   0.494***      0.586***   0.389*** 
  (0.092)     (0.083)   (0.140) 
Population growth, %  -4.563**   -11.364   -2.665 
  (2.096)     (7.619)   (1.938) 
log GDP per capita  -0.058      0.104   -0.143 
  (0.113)     (0.125)   (0.183) 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.013*     -0.020**    0.011 
  (0.008)     (0.009)   (0.009) 
Civil conflict incidence   0.136      0.222   -0.041 
  (0.153)     (0.180)   (0.197) 
Time trend  -0.201     -0.263    0.230 
  (0.139)     (0.164)   (0.274) 
Constant  -0.305     -1.048   -6.333 
  (2.850)     (3.399)   (4.862) 
Observations      765         520       245 
Countries       46          40        23 
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Reanalysis results controlling for FDR are also summarized in Tables 10-14 with 
models isolating countries with a FDR less than 50% located in the center column and 
models with counties exhibiting a FDR greater than 50% displayed in the right-hand 
column models. In contrast to the dampening effect of high FDRs on civil conflict, a 
higher FDR appears to have the opposite effect on most social conflict events. The 
coefficient estimates for total events (Table 10, Model 16), nonviolent (Table 11, Model 
19), violent events (Table 12, Model 22), and government-targeted events (Table 13, 
Model 25) actually increase for countries with a FDR greater than 50%. Conversely, 
countries that produce the majority of their cereal foods (FDR <50%) experience either a 
reduction in their coefficient estimates or simply no change across the same social 
conflict event types (Tables 10-13, center column models). This divergent effect may 
actually indicate a stepped approach to conflict intensity. Countries with larger 
agriculture sectors (lower FDRs) are more likely to experience larger swings in food 
supplies as a result of fluctuations in precipitations than majority importers (higher 
FDRs). These resource fluctuations have the potential to reach levels extreme enough, as 
indicated in Table 9 results, to alter the cost-benefit analysis of individual actors and 
funding streams necessary to mobilize and sustain civil conflict, civil conflict being more 
intensive and riskier than lower forms of social conflict. Conversely, the resource 
instabilities occurring in high FDR countries are likely to be much less and, perhaps, only 
reach levels significant enough to initiate lower levels of social conflict, levels that low 
FDR countries have already surpassed.  
The only category in which higher FDRs create a dampening effect is non-
government-targeted events (Table 14, Model 28). In these cases, the correlation between 
precipitation shocks and non-government-targeted events initially present in Hendrix and 
Salehyan’s original model effectively disappears. Additionally, the coefficient estimate 
for countries producing the majority of their cereal supplies strengthens, as it did in the 
case of civil conflict events, when compared to the original model, as well as increasing 
in statistical significance (Table 14, Model 27). A potential explanation for this finding 
may lie in the underlying resource driving the conflict. Again, fluctuations in cereal 
supplies are less likely to occur in high FDR countries whereas the fluctuation in water 
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supplies could be much more extreme for these countries following variations in 
precipitation—water sensitivity perhaps being the causal reason for a country’s higher 
FDR. Water rights and distribution infrastructures are typically government controlled 
functions which may cause them to take the brunt of public malcontent that surfaces 
during anomalously wet and dry years in high FDR countries. The contrasting effect of 
which is lower instances of non-government-targeted conflict in high FDR countries. 
Performance of the control variables in the original models were inconsistent and 
remain so under reanalysis. Population is the most stable with statistically significant 
(minimum significance of p < 0.05) positive, linear effects appearing across all original 
and FDR isolated models. Population growth and real GDP growth each display varying 
degrees of a negative, linear effect within several categories of social conflict; however, 
both variables are somewhat erratic when compared across all models. 
Overall, these results provide mixed support for Hypothesis 2. Models 12 and 13 
provide evidence that the degree to which a country depends on foreign sources for food 
supplies significantly alters the effect that large deviations in precipitation have on 
influencing the onset of civil war and insurgency. As suggested in Hypothesis 2, 
countries who import the majority of their cereal supplies are insulated from the positive, 
linear relationship between precipitation shocks and conflict while countries who 
cultivate the majority of their cereal domestically are more susceptible to this effect. 
Likewise, Models 27 and 28 provide similar evidence that higher FDRs dampen the 
effects of precipitation shocks on non-government-targeted social conflict events. 
For violent, nonviolent, and government-targeted events, the assumption that a 
country’s FDR plays a role in how deviations from normal rainfall patterns impact social 
conflict continues to hold true. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2, higher FDRs amplify 
the observed connection between precipitation shocks and the outbreak of these three 
forms of social conflict. The fact that civil conflict and government-targeted social 
conflict fail to align within the results is of particular interest given that the government 
represents one side of the conflict in both cases. Again, potential explanations for the 
contrasting effects may lie in the progressive nature of conflict from lower levels of 
social conflict to full-blown civil war. Arguably, nonviolent, non-government-targeted 
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actions represent the least costly form of conflict, both in terms of risk and required 
resources, with civil conflict residing on the opposite end of that continuum. Since higher 
FDRs are likely to limit the intensity of cereal supply fluctuations associated with 
deviations in rainfall, the effects of anomalous rainfall may only begin to materialize in 
high FDR countries at lower levels of conflict—indicative in the absence of correlation 
for civil conflict for these countries. Low FDR countries, on the other hand, experience 
fluctuations in cereal supplies large enough to impact the incidence of more intensive 
conflict actions up through civil war 
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The main objective of this thesis was to determine whether a country’s reliance on 
foreign sourced food supplies alters the impact of climate change-induced conflict within 
African nations. To test this hypothesis, this thesis reanalyzed a study by Hendrix and 
Salehyan examining the impact of precipitation on various levels of conflict by separating 
countries as majority producers and majority importers of cereal foods. The results of 
these isolated regressions indicate that a country’s dependence on foreign food sources 
does, in fact, matter.  
Three major conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the ability of 
African countries to respond efficiently to fluctuations in food production falls short as 
evidenced by the lagged response of cereal supplies, imports in particular, to significant 
deviations in precipitation. Second, countries that secure the majority of their cereal 
supplies from foreign sources, through either importation or emergency aid, are insulated 
from the impacts of rainfall deviations on civil conflict. Third, the effect of fluctuations in 
precipitation on most lower levels of social conflict is greater in countries with relatively 
high FDRs when compared to countries that produce the majority of their food. 
When discussing national security, resource independence is often touted as a 
primary objective. This thesis, however, suggests that, in the case of food, a more 
diversified approach to maintaining food security might actually reduce a country’s risk 
of climate change-induced conflict. As the variability of precipitation patterns increase, 
the risk of falling victim to large swings in food supplies become greater for countries 
that rely more heavily on domestic agricultural production. Additionally, for countries 
whose overall economies are largely agrarian in nature, as is the case across much of 
Africa, extreme fluctuations in annual harvests have the potential to induce corresponding 
fluctuations in incomes which, in turn, increases the probability of conflict even further.  
For policy makers, investments focused on improving water management 
infrastructure as a means to stabilize water supplies have the potential to reduce the 
impacts of anomalously wet and dry conditions on the overall incidence of conflict. 
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Additionally, this thesis demonstrates a need for countries to develop more responsive 
commodity markets to manage and forecast food supplies following large swings in 
domestic production. The current lag times exhibited between production losses 
following drought conditions and the receipt of foreign imports and emergency aid may 
prove too lengthy to prevent immediate food shortages. Likewise, it appears as though 
many countries fail to take advantage of bumper crops as an opportunity to stockpile 
cereals to maintain future levels of food security and, instead, simply cut back on 
imports—perhaps to reduce government spending. 
With regards to future climate change-conflict research, this study highlights the 
need to investigate how social, political, economic, and environmental factors may 
influence the impacts of climate change on the incidence of conflict at each intermediate 
linkage along the causal chain. On the surface, the results of this thesis would seem to 
suggest that if a country’s climate becomes more arid, thereby reducing its overall 
agricultural capacity, it will become less prone to civil war given that its FDR will likely 
go up. That, however, is a rather dangerous and misguided assumption to make. It is 
inconceivable to assume that variations in climatic conditions will impact all nations 
equally.  
Researchers must resist a broad-brush approach to applying potential causal 
connections evenly across all countries and instead dig deeper to uncover the various 
intermediate mechanisms and underlying conditions that propel one society towards 
conflict while leaving another society relatively unscathed. Zimbabwe and Botswana, for 
example, exist in relative close geographic proximity and yet the individual strategies 
they employ to secure their food, whether by choice or by necessity, exist on opposite 
ends of the spectrum with Zimbabwe importing 20% of its cereal supplies while 
Botswana imports upwards of 80%. Exhibiting a relatively high FDR is not necessarily 
indicative of a country’s need to import food based on environmental conditions. Instead, 
it may simply represent a government’s willingness to import food, a trait typically 
beholden to more democratic nations and their increased attentiveness to the needs of 
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their citizens.89 As Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen once noted, “there has never been a 
famine in a functioning multiparty democracy.”90 In other cases, a high FDR could 
merely indicate a country’s ability to import food due to economic prosperity or abundant 
oil reserves. A country that relies heavily on foreign food sources may appear somewhat 
insulated from certain precipitation related effects of climate change; however, the 
underlying conditions that influence a country’s FDR vary and, in turn, may leave it 
vulnerable to an alternate set of risks. 
Ultimately, the end goal is to identify the specific risk factors at the country-level 
that increases a particular nation’s vulnerability to conflict. Climate change itself, rising 
global temperatures and warming oceans, will not necessarily cause more conflict and 
most certainly will not impact all nations equally. The consequences however, of a 
changing climate, such as shifts in growing seasons and weather related natural disasters, 
are predicted to increase in both frequency and intensity. These disruptive events, in turn, 
have the potential to expose or exacerbate underlying social, political, and economic 
conditions that are conducive to conflict. Risk analysis and resilience building require a 
holistic approach. Although we continue to improve our ability to predict where the 
broader manifestations of climate change are likely to occur, we must also strive to 
expand our ability to measure and increase the individual resilience capacity of countries 
that find themselves directly in climate change’s crosshairs. Mitigation strategies 
concentrated at the national-level to better address a country’s individual resilience gaps 
and simultaneous efforts to combat global climate change have the potential to promote a 
more verdant and peaceful society.   
                                                 
89 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Anchor Books, a division of Random 
House, Inc., 1999), 178-184. 
90 Ibid., 178. 
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